“Just as the President and Congress worked together in recent weeks on an economic rescue plan to help bring stability to our financial markets, we must now take additional action and pass a jobs creation and economic recovery stimulus plan,” Pelosi said.

The October 13 forum, to be held in the Speaker’s office in the Capitol, will help Congress develop an economic recovery plan that will create jobs by rebuilding our roads, bridges and highways, prevent cuts to vital government services such as health, education, and public safety, extend unemployment benefits, and help families cope with rising food costs.

“House Democratic leaders look forward to hearing from many of America’s preeminent economic minds on what Congress and the President can do together to help families who are struggling in these difficult and worrying economic times,” Pelosi said.

The full text of the letter to Secretary Paulson:

October 7, 2008

Secretary Henry Paulson
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Secretary Paulson:

All Americans are hopeful that the recently enacted Emergency Economic Stabilization Act will be successful in instilling confidence in our financial markets. The original proposal which you submitted to Congress in mid-September did not contain essential provisions to ensure appropriate independent oversight, judicial or administrative review, or adequate safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest. As you are aware, Congress added several provisions to this legislation to significantly increase independent oversight, accountability, and transparency. In particular, Congress voted overwhelmingly to include provisions to avoid or minimize conflicts of interest.

The new law provides the Treasury Secretary discretion to decide how to address conflicts of interest through guidelines, regulations, or by prohibiting them altogether. As I have reviewed the interim guidelines issued by Treasury yesterday, and those in Treasury’s solicitation for asset management and other portfolio management services, I am very concerned that they fail to meet the tough conflict of interest standard directed by Congress in the legislation.

Under these guidelines, companies that benefit from the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) may also be eligible to offer asset management or other contractor services if Treasury personnel approve a mitigation plan. These guidelines would appear to permit financial institutions with a clear conflict of interest to participate in the management of the TARP, a situation that provides insufficient protection to taxpayers. Given the significance of the TARP for the recovery of our financial markets, the American public must have complete confidence that those managing the program are doing so entirely for the benefit of the public and not to benefit their own self-interests.

We all need to assure the American people of our commitment to meaningful oversight and to protecting the interests of taxpayers. I therefore urge you to reconsider your interim guidelines and to strengthen them to avoid even the appearance of conflicts of interest by the same financial institutions who may also benefit from the TARP.

best regards,

NANCY PELOSI
Speaker of the House

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Van Hollen
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Speier Sullivan
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Rep. Braley and Chairman Waxman question Robert B. Willumstad and Martin J. Sullivan. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: test
Added: October 7, 2008

October 7, 2008

The Honorable Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
Secretary
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20220

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Today the Oversight Committee held a hearing examining the $85 billion government bailout of AIG. The hearing showed that even after the bailout, AIG has spent freely on executive compensation and perquisites. U.S. taxpayers are paying for AIG’s profligate spending.

Today’s hearing revealed that shortly after the bailout was signed, executives from AIG’s major U.S. life insurance subsidiary, AIG American General, held a week-long conference at an exclusive resort in California. The company spent nearly half a million dollars in a single week at this resort, including thousands of dollars on catered banquets, golf outings, and visits to the resort’s spa and salon.

The hearing also revealed that AIG continues to pay one million dollars a month to an official who helped bring about the company’s downfall. This official, Joseph Cassano, is the former president of AIG’s Financial Products division, the unit that sold the credit default swaps that caused billions in losses for AIG. Mr. Cassano resigned from his position in March 2008. Yet AIG has inexplicably decided to pay Mr. Cassano up to $34 million in unvested bonuses. Even today, it is continuing to employ him as a “consultant” for one million dollars a month.

Secretary Paulson, this situation is unfair to taxpayers. AIG received $85 billion in taxpayer money, yet it continues to lavish its executives with undeserved payments and perquisites. We urge you to protect the taxpayers’ money and end this profligate spending.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Waxman
Chairman

Elijah E. Cummings
Member of Congress

Bruce Braley
Member of Congress

Jackie Speier
Member of Congress

Witnesses testifying are:

Eric R. Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department
Lynn E. Turner, former chief accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission
Robert B. Willumstad, former Chief Executive Officer, AIG
Martin J. Sullivan, former Chief Executive Officer, AIG

Rep. Bruce Braley (D-IA) and Chairman Waxman question Robert B. Willumstad and Martin J. Sullivan on executive compensation:

Waxman: “When I retire I want to come to work for you at a million dollars a month. What a good deal that is. And what a good signal that is - the man goes out on his own in these derivative deals that bring down AIG and he gets a million dollars a month retainer in case you need his advice.”

Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and Chairman Waxman question Robert B. Willumstad and Martin J. Sullivan on executive compensation:

Rep. Van Hollen: “I gotta say, a lot of people are scratching their heads when they look at how in good times you stick with the general scheme for pay-for-performance and in the bad times it gets reinterpreted in a way that benefits executives.”

Rep. Peter Welch (D-VT) asks about SEC oversight:

Welch: “You said that the SEC office of risk management was reduced to a staff. Did you say, of one?” Turner: “Yeah, when that gentleman would go home at night he could turn the lights out in February of this year. We had just gotten down to one person at the SEC responsible for identifying the risks at all the institutions. Welch: “So that included the $62 trillion dollar credit default swap?” Turner: “That’s correct.”

Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN) on AIG’s public statements vs. the reality of their financial situation:

Rep. McCollum: “In December 2007, for example, Mr. Sullivan told AIG investors ‘we believe we have a remarkable business platform with great prospects that represent tremendous value.’ Two months later AIG posted $5.3 billion dollar losses for the quarter.”

Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA) on executive compensation:

Rep. Speier: “I have to tell you, you make a shameful profile of corporate America. To you Mr. Willumstad, I will say thank you for foregoing your golden parachute. And to you Mr. Sullivan, shame on you. The shareholders of that company have nothing and you walked away with $50 million dollars.”

Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) on executive compensation:

Rep. Van Hollen: “You hear a lot of talk from some of the CEOs about how they have these pay for performance plans - in the good times they benefit but when times are tough they take a hit. I think the more that we look at these different companies like AIG we find that they rig the rules so in good times they do well and in bad times they do well.”

Rep. John Yarmuth (D-KY) on executive compensation:

Rep. Yarmuth: “We had CEOs walking away from a train wreck with huge severance packages…including a $15 billion dollar severance package…My question that most every American would have is - is there any way that the compensation committee or the corporation could justify that type of activity as being responsible or in the best interest of the stockholders if there’s such a dramatic turnaround and loss…?”

Rep. Braley reads from a Financial Times article which sets the record straight on who blocked GSE reform: "The Ohio Republican who headed the House financial services committee until his retirement after mid-term elections last year, blames the mess [at Fannie and Freddie] on ideologues within the White House as well as Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve. The critics have forgotten that the House passed a GSE reform bill in 2005 that could well have prevented the current crisis, says Mr Oxley, now vice-chairman of Nasdaq. He fumes about the criticism of his House colleagues. All the handwringing and bedwetting is going on without remembering how the House stepped up on this, he says. What did we get from the White House? We got a one-finger salute." You can read the entire article at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8780c35e-7e91-11dd-b1af-000077b07658.html

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress GSE reform Freddie Mac Fannie Mae Oxley
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout McCollum
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Yarmuth
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Van Hollen
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Braley
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Welch
Added: October 7, 2008

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Waxman
Added: October 7, 2008

Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD) on the expenditures:

Have you heard of anything more outrageous - a week after taxpayers commit $85 billion dollars to rescue AIG, the company’s leading insurance executives spend hundreds of thousands of dollars at one of the most exclusive reports in the nation…Let me describe for some of you the charges that the shareholders, taxpayers, had to pay. AIG spent $200,000 dollars for hotel rooms. Almost $150,000 for catered banquets. AIG spent $23,000 at the hotel spa and another $1,400 at the salon. They were getting manicures, facials, pedicures and massages while American people were footing the bill. And they spent another $10,000 dollars for I don’t know what this is, leisure dining. Bars?

Watch:

Today, the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to government bailout of AIG. Learn more about the hearing at: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Congress AIG bailout Cummings
Added: October 7, 2008

Chairman Waxman’s opening statement:

Today we are holding our second day of hearings on the financial crisis on Wall Street.

Yesterday, we examined the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Our focus today is AIG.

There are obvious differences between Lehman and AIG. Lehman is an investment bank; AIG is an insurance company. Lehman fell because it placed highly leveraged bets in the subprime and real estate markets; AIG’s problems originate in complex derivatives called credit default swaps.

But their stories are fundamentally the same. In each case, the companies and their executives grew rich by taking on excessive risk. In each case, the companies collapsed when these risks turned bad. And in each case, their executives are walking away with millions of dollars while taxpayers are stuck with billions of dollars in costs.

The AIG CEOs are like the Lehman CEO in one other key respect: in each case, they refuse to accept any blame for what happened to their companies.

In preparation for this hearing, the Committee has received tens of thousands of pages of documents from AIG. Our review of the documents raises three fundamental sets of questions. Answering these questions will be the focus of today’s hearing.

The first set of questions is whether AIG’s executive compensation practices were fair and appropriate.

AIG has a “Senior Partners Plan” that provides cash bonuses for its top 70 executives. This plan is supposed to be performance based. In 2005, AIG’s CEO, Martin Sullivan, received $2.7 million under this plan. In 2006, his first full year as CEO, he received $5.7 million under the plan.

These payments are not in question. Both years were good for AIG, and as CEO, Mr. Sullivan naturally was well rewarded.

2007 is a completely different story. AIG lost over $5 billion in the final quarter of 2007 due to losses attributable to its financial products division, called AIG FP. Under the terms of the “Senior Partners Plan,” Mr. Sullivan and the other top executives should have had their bonuses slashed due to poor performance.

But when the compensation committee met on March 11, 2008, to award bonuses for 2007, Mr. Sullivan urged the committee to ignore the losses from the financial products division in calculating his bonus and the bonuses of other top executives.

We obtained a copy of the minutes from that meeting. Here is what they say:

Mr. Sullivan next presented Management’s recommendation with respect to the earnout for the Senior Partners Plan, suggesting that the AIGFP unrealized market valuation losses be excluded from the calculation.

The board approved this change in the “Senior Partners Plan,” ignored the losses from the financial products division, and gave Mr. Sullivan a cash bonus of over $5 million.

Today we will ask what could possibly justify this change in the compensation formula.

There are other compensation questions we will also ask. In March, the board approved a new compensation contract for Mr. Sullivan that gave him a golden parachute worth $15 million. We will ask why that was in the interests of the shareholders.

And we will ask about the compensation of Joseph Cassano, who was the executive in charge of the financial products division. Mr. Cassano was well compensated by AIG. He received more than $280 million over the last eight years.

After his division imploded, AIG terminated him without cause in February and did not seek to recover any of Mr. Cassano’s compensation. Instead, AIG allowed him to keep up to $34 million in unvested bonuses and put him on a $1 million a month retainer.

Last month, the taxpayers bought out AIG in an $85 billion bailout. This was a direct result of the mistakes made by Mr. Cassano. Yet even today, he remains on the company payroll, receiving $1 million a month.

The federal bailout occurred on September 16. Less than one week later, AIG held a week-long retreat for company executives at the exclusive St. Regis Resort in Monarch Beach, California. A photograph of the resort is on display.

Rooms at this resort can cost over $1,000 per night. Invoices provided to the Committee show that AIG paid the resort over $440,000, including nearly $200,000 for rooms, over $150,000 for meals, and $23,000 in spa charges.

Average Americans are suffering economically. They are losing their jobs, their homes, and their health insurance. Yet less than one week after the taxpayers rescued AIG, company executives could be found wining and dining at one of the most exclusive resorts in the nation.

We will ask whether any of this makes sense.

The second set of questions we will ask is whether Mr. Sullivan and Robert Willumstad are right when they say they bear no responsibility for the collapse of AIG.

Mr. Sullivan was CEO from March 2005 to June 2008. Mr. Willumstad was his successor. He joined the AIG board in January 2006 and served as chairman from November 2006 until he was named CEO in June 2008.

According to their testimony, AIG failed because it was “caught in a vicious cycle” and hit by “a global financial tsunami.” Mr. Willumstad says: “I don’t believe AIG could have done anything differently.”

The information we have received paints a different picture. We have obtained a confidential letter from the Office of Thrift Supervision to AIG’s general counsel.

In this March 10, 2008, letter, the Office of Thrift Supervision writes: “We are concerned that the corporate oversight of AIG Financial Products … lacks critical elements of independence, transparency, and granularity.”

Internal company documents show that AIG’s auditor, Pricewaterhouse Cooper, reported similar problems. Minutes from a meeting of the board’s audit committee in March 2008 reveal that Pricewaterhouse Cooper told the committee that the “root cause” of AIG’s problems was that risk control groups did not have “appropriate access” to the financial products division.

As part of our investigation, the Committee requested information from a former AIG auditor, Joseph St. Denis. Mr. St. Denis was a senior SEC enforcement official who was hired by AIG to address its ongoing accounting problems.

But when he expressed concerns about how the financial products division was valuing its liabilities, Mr. Cassano told him: “I have deliberately excluded you from the valuation … because I was concerned that you would pollute the process.”

Ultimately, Mr. St. Denis resigned in protest. As he explains, “Mr. Cassano took actions that I believed were intended to prevent me from performing the job duties for which I was hired.” Unlike Mr. Cassano and Mr. Sullivan, Mr. St. Denis’s actions cost him his bonus.

There are other questionable actions by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Willumstad. As losses were mounting and resources were getting scarce, AIG depleted its capital by over $10 billion through stock buybacks and rising dividend payments.

This prompted shareholders to write the board: “The management and board inexcusably and inexplicably raised the dividend while simultaneously issuing expensive preferred stock and common stock at a discount.”

Finally, we will ask whether AIG — and in particular Mr. Sullivan — misled investors and the public about the financial conditions of the company.

On December 5, 2007, Mr. Sullivan told investors: “we are confident in our marks and the reasonableness of our valuation methods. … [W]e have a high degree of certainty in what we have booked to date.”

What Mr. Sullivan didn’t tell investors was that on November 29 — one week earlier — Pricewaterhouse Cooper had “raised their concerns with Mr. Sullivan …, informing [him] that PWC believed that AIG could have a material weakness relating to the risk management of these areas.”

There is one witness who should be here today, but who will be missing: Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, the long-time CEO of AIG. Mr. Greenberg blames Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Willumstad for the downfall of AIG. Many others think it is Mr. Greenberg who sowed the seeds that led to AIG’s failure. Regrettably, Mr. Greenberg has told the Committee that he is too ill to appear today to answer questions.

There is a lot of ground for the Committee to cover today. We will probe AIG’s executive compensation arrangements, the leadership of its top officials, and the veracity of their public statements. Our goal is to examine the details of AIG’s fall so that we can learn lessons about the reforms needed to restore stability to our financial markets.

Like all of our witnesses, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Willumstad know we will ask hard questions. I also want them and our other witnesses to know that we appreciate their cooperation and appearance before the Committee today.

Watch Chairman Waxman’s opening statement:

Transcript:

Today we are holding our second day of hearings on the financial crisis on Wall Street.

Yesterday, we examined the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Our focus today is AIG.

There are obvious differences between Lehman and AIG. Lehman is an investment bank; AIG is an insurance company. Lehman fell because it placed highly leveraged bets in the subprime and real estate markets; AIG’s problems originate in complex derivatives called credit default swaps.

But their stories are fundamentally the same. In each case, the companies and their executives grew rich by taking on excessive risk. In each case, the companies collapsed when these risks turned bad. And in each case, their executives are walking away with millions of dollars while taxpayers are stuck with billions of dollars in costs.

The AIG CEOs are like the Lehman CEO in one other key respect: in each case, they refuse to accept any blame for what happened to their companies.

In preparation for this hearing, the Committee has received tens of thousands of pages of documents from AIG. Our review of the documents raises three fundamental sets of questions. Answering these questions will be the focus of today’s hearing.

The first set of questions is whether AIG’s executive compensation practices were fair and appropriate.

AIG has a “Senior Partners Plan” that provides cash bonuses for its top 70 executives. This plan is supposed to be performance based. In 2005, AIG’s CEO, Martin Sullivan, received $2.7 million under this plan. In 2006, his first full year as CEO, he received $5.7 million under the plan.

These payments are not in question. Both years were good for AIG, and as CEO, Mr. Sullivan naturally was well rewarded.

2007 is a completely different story. AIG lost over $5 billion in the final quarter of 2007 due to losses attributable to its financial products division, called AIG FP. Under the terms of the “Senior Partners Plan,” Mr. Sullivan and the other top executives should have had their bonuses slashed due to poor performance.

But when the compensation committee met on March 11, 2008, to award bonuses for 2007, Mr. Sullivan urged the committee to ignore the losses from the financial products division in calculating his bonus and the bonuses of other top executives.

We obtained a copy of the minutes from that meeting. Here is what they say:

Mr. Sullivan next presented Management’s recommendation with respect to the earnout for the Senior Partners Plan, suggesting that the AIGFP unrealized market valuation losses be excluded from the calculation.

The board approved this change in the “Senior Partners Plan,” ignored the losses from the financial products division, and gave Mr. Sullivan a cash bonus of over $5 million.

Today we will ask what could possibly justify this change in the compensation formula.

There are other compensation questions we will also ask. In March, the board approved a new compensation contract for Mr. Sullivan that gave him a golden parachute worth $15 million. We will ask why that was in the interests of the shareholders.

And we will ask about the compensation of Joseph Cassano, who was the executive in charge of the financial products division. Mr. Cassano was well compensated by AIG. He received more than $280 million over the last eight years.

After his division imploded, AIG terminated him without cause in February and did not seek to recover any of Mr. Cassano’s compensation. Instead, AIG allowed him to keep up to $34 million in unvested bonuses and put him on a $1 million a month retainer.

Last month, the taxpayers bought out AIG in an $85 billion bailout. This was a direct result of the mistakes made by Mr. Cassano. Yet even today, he remains on the company payroll, receiving $1 million a month.

The federal bailout occurred on September 16. Less than one week later, AIG held a week-long retreat for company executives at the exclusive St. Regis Resort in Monarch Beach, California. A photograph of the resort is on display.

Rooms at this resort can cost over $1,000 per night. Invoices provided to the Committee show that AIG paid the resort over $440,000, including nearly $200,000 for rooms, over $150,000 for meals, and $23,000 in spa charges.

Average Americans are suffering economically. They are losing their jobs, their homes, and their health insurance. Yet less than one week after the taxpayers rescued AIG, company executives could be found wining and dining at one of the most exclusive resorts in the nation.

We will ask whether any of this makes sense.

The second set of questions we will ask is whether Mr. Sullivan and Robert Willumstad are right when they say they bear no responsibility for the collapse of AIG.

Mr. Sullivan was CEO from March 2005 to June 2008. Mr. Willumstad was his successor. He joined the AIG board in January 2006 and served as chairman from November 2006 until he was named CEO in June 2008.

According to their testimony, AIG failed because it was “caught in a vicious cycle” and hit by “a global financial tsunami.” Mr. Willumstad says: “I don’t believe AIG could have done anything differently.”

The information we have received paints a different picture. We have obtained a confidential letter from the Office of Thrift Supervision to AIG’s general counsel.

In this March 10, 2008, letter, the Office of Thrift Supervision writes: “We are concerned that the corporate oversight of AIG Financial Products … lacks critical elements of independence, transparency, and granularity.”

Internal company documents show that AIG’s auditor, Pricewaterhouse Cooper, reported similar problems. Minutes from a meeting of the board’s audit committee in March 2008 reveal that Pricewaterhouse Cooper told the committee that the “root cause” of AIG’s problems was that risk control groups did not have “appropriate access” to the financial products division.

As part of our investigation, the Committee requested information from a former AIG auditor, Joseph St. Denis. Mr. St. Denis was a senior SEC enforcement official who was hired by AIG to address its ongoing accounting problems.

But when he expressed concerns about how the financial products division was valuing its liabilities, Mr. Cassano told him: “I have deliberately excluded you from the valuation … because I was concerned that you would pollute the process.”

Ultimately, Mr. St. Denis resigned in protest. As he explains, “Mr. Cassano took actions that I believed were intended to prevent me from performing the job duties for which I was hired.” Unlike Mr. Cassano and Mr. Sullivan, Mr. St. Denis’s actions cost him his bonus.

There are other questionable actions by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Willumstad. As losses were mounting and resources were getting scarce, AIG depleted its capital by over $10 billion through stock buybacks and rising dividend payments.

This prompted shareholders to write the board: “The management and board inexcusably and inexplicably raised the dividend while simultaneously issuing expensive preferred stock and common stock at a discount.”

Finally, we will ask whether AIG — and in particular Mr. Sullivan — misled investors and the public about the financial conditions of the company.

On December 5, 2007, Mr. Sullivan told investors: “we are confident in our marks and the reasonableness of our valuation methods. … [W]e have a high degree of certainty in what we have booked to date.”

What Mr. Sullivan didn’t tell investors was that on November 29 — one week earlier — Pricewaterhouse Cooper had “raised their concerns with Mr. Sullivan …, informing [him] that PWC believed that AIG could have a material weakness relating to the risk management of these areas.”

There is one witness who should be here today, but who will be missing: Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, the long-time CEO of AIG. Mr. Greenberg blames Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Willumstad for the downfall of AIG. Many others think it is Mr. Greenberg who sowed the seeds that led to AIG’s failure. Regrettably, Mr. Greenberg has told the Committee that he is too ill to appear today to answer questions.

There is a lot of ground for the Committee to cover today. We will probe AIG’s executive compensation arrangements, the leadership of its top officials, and the veracity of their public statements. Our goal is to examine the details of AIG’s fall so that we can learn lessons about the reforms needed to restore stability to our financial markets.

Like all of our witnesses, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Willumstad know we will ask hard questions. I also want them and our other witnesses to know that we appreciate their cooperation and appearance before the Committee today.

Today the Oversight Committee is holding a hearing to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers. Watch Chairman Henry Waxman's opening statement. To read a transcript or learn more about the hearing, visit the committee's website: http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2210

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Waxman Lehman Brothers bankruptcy Wall Street economy Congress
Added: October 6, 2008

Rep. Elijah E. Cummings questions Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Lehman Brothers Holdings.

Author: NancyPelosi
Keywords: Oversight Cummings Fuld Lehman Brothers bankruptcy Wall Street economy Congress
Added: October 6, 2008